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THE WASHINGTON EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT:
A SUBSTANTIAL PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
D. Greg Blanldnship
Abstract: Under the Washington Administrative Procedures Act, a party can challenge an
agency action in superior court. The Washington Legislature adopted the Equal Access to
Justice Act, which provides fees to qualified parties that prevail in judicial reviews of agency
actions, to encourage individuals and small businesses to oppose unjust agency actions. The
effectiveness of this fee-shifting provision is significantly limited because awards are not
authorized when a court decides that the agency action is substantially justified. The
legislature should remove this limitation. Where the agency action involves factual
determinations or the interpretation of statutes or regulations within the expertise of the
challenged agency, the standard for reviewing the underlying agency action (which turns on a
determination of reasonableness) makes the substantial-justification limit redundant. Where
the agency action involves questions of pure law, the limit thwarts the legislature's goal of
encouraging individuals to oppose unjust agency actions for their own and society's benefit

Jurisprudence in the United States requires that each party pay its own
litigation costs. While this "American rule" regarding attorney's fees is
the prevailing practice, federal and state legislatures have enacted
numerous statutory exceptions to the rule.' Modeled after a federal act,2
Washington State has adopted one such fee-shifting provision: the
Washington Equal Access to Justice Act (WEAJA).3 The WEAJA
provides fees to qualified parties that prevail in judicial reviews of
agency actions.4 However, the application of the WEAJA is restricted by
a statutory limitation that prevents a prevailing party from recovering
attorney's fees where the agency action is "substantially justified."5 Since
the adoption of the WEAJA in 1995,' the Washington Courts of Appeal
have awarded attorney's fees under the WEAJA only four times.

1. See generally Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State "Equal Access to
JusticeActs"?, 71 CH.-KENT L. REV. 547, 549 (1995).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.350 (2001); 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 403, § 903 (West).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.350.
5. Id. § 4.84.350(1).
6. 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 403, § 903 (West).
7. There are thirteen Washington Appellate cases in which a qualified party requested fees
pursuant to the WEAJA. The four cases that awarded fees are Sugano v. University of Washington,
No. 98-2-00128-3, 2000 WL 339895 (wash. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2000), Hunter v. University of
Washington, 101 Wash. App. 283, 2 P.3d 1022 (2000), Alpine Lakes Protection Society v.
Washington State Department of Natural Resources, 102 Wash. App. 1, 979 P.2d 929 (1999), and
Aponte v. Washington State Department of Social & Health Services, 92 Wash. App. 604, 965 P.2d
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This parsimonious allowance of fees under the WEAJA prevents a
legislatively mandated fee-shifting provision from protecting the rights
of citizens against an encroaching administrative state. As legislatures
delegate rule-making authority, administrative agencies are largely
responsible for the distribution of benefits conferred to a state's citizens
and for the assessment of fines where a private entity has breached a
statutory duty. However, administrative agencies are not directly
responsible to the citizenry, and ensuring agency accountability becomes
a concern in a free society. 8
Judicial review of agency action provides a critical tool for policing
agency actions.9 However, when administrative agencies benefit from
vast expertise, substantial funds, and deferential standards of review,
private citizens are disadvantaged and courts cannot effectively regulate
agency action. The Washington Legislature adopted the WEAJA in order
to level the playing field for the aggrieved party, thereby benefiting
society as a whole.'0
The Legislature should remove the substantial justification limit from
the WEAJA for two reasons. First, where a party challenges either an
agency's factual ruling or an interpretation of a statute or regulation
within the agency's expertise, the standard of review required by the
Washington Administrative Procedures Act (WAPA) renders the
substantial justification limit redundant. Second, where a party
challenges an agency decision based on pure law, the substantial
justification limit functions contrary to legislative intent.

626 (1998). There may be many Superior Court cases in which fees were awarded or denied but not
appealed. That seems unlikely: any action that an agency is willing to defend in court is likely to
elicit an appeal from a decision awarding fees. Commentator Susan Olson tried to gather information
on trial court decisions of state EAJAs and found that the addition of trial court applications to
appellate courts did not significantly increase the number of reported EAJA cases. Olson, supranote
I, at 549. This author attempted to compile information on Superior Court decisions regarding the
WEAJA with little success. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.067 requires the Office of Financial
Management to create a report detailing fees awarded pursuant to the WEAJA. However, the Office
of Financial Management and the Public Records Officer of the Attorney General's Office contend
that no such report exists because the Legislature decided it no longer required those reports, but did
not change the statute. E-mail from Kim McLain, Public Records Officer, Washington State
Attorney General's Office, to D. Greg Blankinship (Mar. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
8. JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 10 (1990).

9. Barry Friedman, DialogueandJudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577,634-35 (1993).
10. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy benefits of the
WEAJA).

Washington Equal Access to Justice Act
I.

THE FEDERAL EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

One of the most significant exceptions to the American rule regarding
attorney's fees is the Equal Access To Justice Act (EAJA), the federal
statute upon which the WEAJA is based." The federal EAJA provides
fees to any qualified party that prevails against the United States2
government or its agencies in any civil action not sounding in torts.'
However, where the government's position (including the underlying
agency action and the steps taken by the government to defend that
action) is "substantially justified," fees may not be awarded.' 3 Per the
United States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood,"*an agency's
position is substantially justified if the action is "justified to a degree that
could satisfy a reasonable person [as having a] reasonable basis in both
law and fact."1 5
A.

The American Rule

The "American rule" requires litigants to pay their own litigation
costs. 6 Its purpose is "to ensure ready access to the courts by reducing
penalties for failure."' 7 Courts justify the rule on the grounds of stare
decisis and separation of powers, reasoning that it is the role of the
legislature to change this long-standing rule." Under this rule, a court
may only grant fees to a prevailing party if there is express statutory
authority allowing fees, or if one of the few common law exceptions
applies. 9
The American rule reflects the assumption that potential litigants gain
easier access to the courts when not faced with the risk of paying the
litigation costs of both sides.20 However, where the resources of one
party outstrip those of the other party, the better-heeled party can deter
11. Olson, supranote 1, at 555.
12. 28 U.S.C. §2412 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
13. Id.
14. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
15. Id. at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,247 (1975).
17. John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Feesfrom Funds, 87 HARV. L
REV. 1597,1597 (1974).
18. See, eg., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306,306 (1796).
19. See generally Stephen B. Shapiro & Michelle D. Hertz, Legislative Update: Recovery of
Attorney's Fees inFederal and State Construction Cases, CONSTRUCTION LAW, July 1999, at 37.
20. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,718 (1967).
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the other party from pursuing its rights by driving up costs. 2 1
Furthermore, state agencies are often "repeat players," because they
repeatedly face similarly situated litigants. As such, state agencies may
engage in "hard-bargaining" tactics, which are more extreme than a case
warrants but are effective in deterring would-be litigants.'
There are three common law exceptions to the American rule. The
first exception applies when the non-prevailing party has acted in a
manner that threatens the integrity of the court system. 2 The second
exception applies where a party has acted in bad faith by initiating or
prolonging litigation. The third exception applies when litigation has
created or preserved "a fund for the benefit of others" and allows
attorneys to collect their legal fees from the fund.25 Because courts
narrowly construe the common law exceptions, litigants generally rely on
statutory fee authorizations.26
B.

The Structure of the FederalEqual Access to JusticeAct

The federal EAJA was adopted amidst the anti-regulatory climate of
the 1980s as an attempt to limit government agencies' infringement upon
individuals' and small businesses' rights.27 The Act establishes a oneway fee-shifting provision, awarding fees to party-opponents of the
United States.2 g The Act requires courts to award fees and costs incurred
by eligible29 parties "in any civil action

. . .

including proceedings for

judicial review of agency action."3

21. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access
to Justice, 42 AM. U.L. REv. 1567, 1619 (1993).
22. Id. at 1620.
23. Id.
24. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,257-59 (1975).
25. Id. at 257.
26. Shapiro & Hertz, supra note 19, at 37. Statutory exceptions to the American rule are specific
legislative provisions, such as the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Act, which provides that a
worker who prevails in a compensation claim is entitled to receive fees. 33 U.S.C. § 928(a) (1994).
In 1993, one commentator identified 153 such statutes. ALBA CONTE, 2 ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS
321-30 (2d ed. 1993).
27. See Susan G. Mazey & Susan Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal Access to
JusticeAct, 77 JUDICATURE 13, 15 (1993).

28. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1994).
29. To qualify as an eligible party, an individual's net worth may not exceed $2,000,000; the net
worth of a business cannot exceed $7,000,000, and it may not have more than 500 employees. Id. at
§ 2412(d)(2)(B).

30. Id. at. § 2412(d)(1)(a).

Washington Equal Access to Justice Act
Congress adopted the Act to encourage citizens to vindicate their
rights against administrative action. As Justice Brennan explained in his
concurrence to Pierce v. Underwood,31 Congress was concerned that
administrative agencies with "vast resources, could force citizens into
acquiescing to adverse Government action, rather than vindicating their
rights, simply by threatening them with costly litigation."32 The federal
EAJA also serves a wider social function by encouraging parties to
oppose unjust agency actions that often implicate a public interest. As the
Fourth Circuit has noted, the purpose of the EAJA was not merely to
ensure that individuals could prevail against unreasonable agency action:
"The public interest would [also] be served by insuring, through a more
balanced adversarial process, that only reasonable governmental
positions... would be enforced. 33
However, the federal EAJA prohibits an award of fees if the court
'
finds that the position of the United States was "substantially justified."34
The legislative history of the federal EAJA indicates that "'substantially
justified' was a congressional attempt to fashion a 'middle ground'
between [a] proposal to award fees in all cases in which the Government
did not prevail, and [a] proposal to award fees only when the
Government's position was 'arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless.""'3 In 1988, the Supreme Court interpreted "substantially
justified," holding in Piercethat the phrase means 'justified in substance
or in the main-that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
' Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia looked to
reasonable person."36
"substantial" as applied in judicial reviews of agency actions. That
phrase means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."37 In adopting this definition, the
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's formulation that the government's
position is substantially justified if it has "[a] reasonable basis both in
law and in fact."'38
Under the federal EAJA, an agency action is substantially justified
only if both the underlying agency action and the subsequent litigation
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

487 U.S. 552 (1988).
Id. at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (internal citations omitted).
Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 1993).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
Id. at 578 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938)).
Id.
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position taken by the agency are substantially justified." However, when
the first version of the federal EAJA was enacted, it only stated that if the
"position of the United States" was substantially justified, an award of
fees was disallowed.4" Appellate courts reasoned that the position of the
United States could mean either "the governmental action that
precipitated the lawsuit... [or] the posture assumed by the government
in litigation. These two interpretations have come to be known,
respectively, as the 'underlying action' and the 'litigation position'
theories."4' The circuits were divided on whether it was only the
underlying action that must be substantially justified, or the litigation
position, or both.4' Congress ended the confusion in 1985, by adding a
definition to the statute: 'position of the United States' means, in
addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the
action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based." 3'
The determination of whether the underlying action or inaction by an
agency is substantially justified is different than the test for whether the
litigation position of the agency in defending the underlying action is
substantially justified. The Ninth Circuit has distinguished an analysis
that focuses solely on the merits of the underlying action (that is, the
logic or reasoning that the agency used to reach its determination to act
or not act) from an analysis that looks to extraneous factors such as the
existence of precedent or the complexity of an issue. Only where the
litigation position of the agency is in question are external factors
relevant to a determination of substantial justification.' Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held in Kali v. Bowen45 that "[t]he inquiry into the nature of the
underlying government action will... concern only the merits of that
action .... [t]he second inquiry must also focus upon extraneous
circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the government's
decision to take a case to trial." 6

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(I).
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539,546 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
Or. Natural Res. Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1992).
Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 332.

Washington Equal Access to Justice Act
II.

THE WASHINGTON STATE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
ACT

The purpose of the WEAJA is to reduce incidents of unreasonable
agency action.4 7 While there are differences between the federal EAJA
and the WEAJA, they both require a court to award fees to qualified
parties that prevail in a judicial review of an agency action unless the
agency action was substantially justified.
A.

The Purposeof the WEAJA Is To Remedy Unjust Agency Action

In 1995, Washington passed the Washington Equal Access to Justice
Act to encourage certain individuals and qualified organizations to
defend themselves against unreasonable agency action.4 8 The legislature
felt it necessary to encourage individuals to pursue judicial review
"because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their
rights." 9 The Legislature believed the problem was compounded by the
greater resources and expertise that administrative agencies could bring
to bear in litigation. 0 Therefore, the Legislature adopted the WEAJA "to
ensure that these parties have a greater opportunity to defend themselves
from inappropriate state agency actions and to protect their rights."'
B.

Statutory and JudicialPrerequisitesto Recovery Underthe WEAJA

There are four statutory and judicial prerequisites to recovery under
the WEAJA. First, the party must prevail in a judicial review of an
agency action; second, the party must be qualified;52 third, the agency
action cannot have been substantially justified; and fourth, an award of
fees cannot be unjust."
The Washington Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute to have
at least two other limits to recovery. First, recovery is only available
when the opponent party is an active and interested party. In Duwamish
47. 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 403 § 901 (West).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. A qualified party is either an individual whose net worth does not exceed one million dollars
or a business or other organization whose net worth does not exceed five million dollars. WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.84.340(5) (2001).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.350(1) (2001).
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Valley Neighborhood Preservation Coalition v. Central Puget Sound
Growth Management HearingsBoard,54 the court declined to award fees
pursuant to the WEAJA because the hearing board is a purely
adjudicative body and not an agency within the meaning of the statute. 5
Rather, the proper agency responsible for fees was the municipality that
violated the Growth Management Act. 6 The second limit to recovery is
that fees incurred at the administrative level are not recoverable. The
Washington Court of Appeals in Alpine Lakes Protection Society v.
Washington State Department of Natural Resources (ALPS)57 held that,
because the statute makes fees available to a party that prevails in a
judicial review of an agency action, "our Legislature did not intend to
make fees incurred at the administrative level available." 58
For the purposes of this Comment, there are two significant
differences between the federal EAJA and the WEAJA. First, the federal
statute awards costs and fees to a prevailing party incurred "in any civil
action (other than cases sounding in tort) including proceedings for
judicial review of agency action." 59 The WEAJA, in contrast, only
applies to judicial review of an agency action." Second, the federal
EAJA requires that fees cannot be awarded if the "position of the United
States" was substantially justified,6' whereas the WEAJA requires that, in
order to avoid paying fees to a62prevailing party, an agency need only
substantially justify its "action.,
The Washington Court of Appeals has adopted the Piercestandard for
determining when an agency's action is substantially justified. 63 The
implications of that decision are the subject of this Comment.

54. 97 Wash. App. 98, 982 P.2d 668 (1999).
55. Id. at 101,982 P.2d at 669; see also Cascade Court Ltd. P'ship v. Noble, 105 Wash. App. 563,
571-72,20 P.3d 997, 1002-03 (2001).
56. Duwamish Valley Neighborhood Pres. Coalition v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. &
Hearings Bd., 97 Wash. App. 98, 101,982 P.2d 668, 669 (1999).
57. Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y v. Wash. State Dep't of Natural Res., 102 Wash. App. 1, 19, 979
P.2d 929, 938 (1999) [hereinafter ALPS].
58. Id. at 938.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994).
60. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.84.350(1) (2001).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
62. WASH. REv.CODE § 4.84.350(1).
63. ALPS, 102 Wash. App. at 19, 979 P.2d at 938.
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III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT

In order to recover fees under the WEAJA, a party must first prevail
upon a trial court to reverse an administrative agency's action. The
Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) sets out limited
circumstances in which a court can reverse an agency's action,' creating
substantial hurdles for individuals seeking redress. Furthermore,
Washington courts, in determining the standard of review required under
the APA, have granted substantial deference to agencies in all
circumstances, except where the issue is one of pure law or where the
interpretation of a statute or regulation is outside the expertise of the
challenged agency.
Circumstances Under Which Courts Can Review Agency Actions

A.

The WAPA provides the exclusive basis for judicial review of an
agency action, and it establishes that the "burden of demonstrating the
invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity."'65 Where
the agency action involves rulemaking, a court will only overturn the
agency if the rule violates constitutional provisions, if it exceeds the
statutory authority of the agency, if the rule was adopted without
compliance with statutory rulemaldng procedures, or if the rule is
arbitrary and capricious.66 Courts will overturn an agency's adjudicative
order if it violates a constitutional provision, if it is outside the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the agency, or if the agency has engaged in
unlawful procedures or decision-maling.67 Courts will also overturn an
agency's adjudicative order if the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law, if the order is not supported by substantial evidence, if
the agency has not decided all issues requiring resolution, if the order is
inconsistent with a rule of the agency, or if it is arbitrary or capricious."

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(1)(b) (2001).
Id. § 34.05.570(1)(a).
Id. § 34.05.570(2)(c).
Id. § 34.05.570(3).
Id.
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Washington Courts Grant SubstantialDeference to Agency Actions
Unless Questions ofPureLaw Are at Issue

Not only are the statutory requirements for reversal of agency action
difficult to meet, but courts grant substantial deference to agencies'
determinations that their own actions meet those requirements. When
reviewing an agency action, Washington courts grant agencies
substantial deference in every case except those that turn on questions of
pure law. There are three types of agency action, each of which requires
a different standard of review: questions of fact, questions of law (which
can be divided between pure questions of law and questions involving
statutes or regulations within the expertise of a challenged agency), and
mixed questions of fact and law (as when a rule or statute is applied to a
particular factual situation). 9
1.

Questions of FactAre Reviewed Under the SubstantialEvidence
Test

Washington courts give substantial deference to agency adjudications
that turn on questions of fact. In Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass 'n v. Chelan
County,7" the Court adopted the substantial evidence test for determining
whether an administrative adjudicator had made a factual error.7 Under
the substantial evidence standard, courts defer to agencies' factual
determinations as long as "there [is] a sufficient quantum of evidence in
the record to persuade a reasonable person that the declared premise is
true. 72 In other words, unless the agency's factual determination is
unreasonable, courts will defer to the agency decision.
Recall that the United States Supreme Court in Pierce defined
"substantial justification" as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 3 Similarly, the
agency need only have "a sufficient quantum of evidence ...to persuade
a reasonable person that the declared premise is true. 74

69. See Franklin County Sheriffs Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 329, 646 P.2d 113, 119
(1982). Because none of the cases that address the WEAJA involve a mixed question of law and
fact, this category of agency action is not discussed in this Comment.
70. 141 Wash. 2d 169,4 P.3d 123 (2000).
71. Id. at 176,4 P.3d 123, 126.
72. Id.
73. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
74. Wenatchee Sportsmen, 141 Wash. 2d at 176,4 P.3d at 126.

Washington Equal Access to Justice Act
2.

Agencies'Interpretationof Statutes Within the Expertise of the
ChallengedAgency Are Given SubstantialDeference

Where the statute falls within the agency's expertise, courts grant
substantial weight to the agency's view of the law. For instance, the
ALPS court noted that "[r]eviewing courts... give substantial weight
and deference to an agency's interpretation of the statutes and regulations
it administers, and the agency's interpretation should be upheld if it
reflects a plausible construction of the language of the statute and is not
contrary to legislative intent."75 Thus, where the agency action at issue
concerns statutory or regulatory interpretation, an aggrieved party must
prove that the agency's interpretation was not even plausible or was
contrary to legislative intent.76
3.

Pure Questions of Law Are Reviewed Under the ErrorofLaw
Standard

On the other hand, pure questions of law, which are reviewed under
the error of law standard, require a significantly different inquiry.
Typical questions of pure law involve the interpretation of statutes that
are not within the expertise of the challenged agency; when that is the
case, courts grant no deference to the agency.'
IV. TlE APPLICATION OF TI-E SUBSTANTIAL JUSTFICATION
LIMIT BY THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS
There are thirteen Washington Court of Appeals cases that address the
WEAJA. In two of those cases, the court did not reach the substantially
justified question because the non-prevailing party was not an agency
within the meaning of the statute.78 In three other cases, the Court of
Appeals did not reach the substantial justification question because the

75. ALPS, 102 Wash. App. 1, 14, 979 P.2d 929,936 (1999).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3) (2001).

77. See Yamauchi v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 28 Wash. App. 427,431, 624 P.2d 197, 199 (1981)
(overruled on other grounds).

78. Duwamish Valley Neighborhood Preservation Coalition v. Central Puget Sound Growth
MngMt. & Hearings Bd., 97 Wash. App. 98, 101, 982 P.2d 668, 669 (1999) (holding that a county
zoning board is not an "agency" within the meaning of RCW § 4.84.340(1)); Cascade Court Ltd.

P'ship v. Noble, 105 Wash. App. 563, 571-72, 20 P.3d 997, 1002-03 (2001) (holding that the Tax
Assessor is not an "agency" within the meaning of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.340(1) (2001)).
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agency prevailed on appeal.79 The remaining eight cases are organized
below based on the applicable standard of review.
There are no defining characteristics of Washington case law
regarding the substantial justification limit to the WEAJA. When viewed
collectively, Washington cases on this issue are either a hodge podge of
conflicting rules and interpretations or they are fact-specific analyses that
simply conclude that an action is or is not substantially justified, with
little or no explanation.
A.

FactualDeterminations

There have been two Washington Court of Appeals cases in which the
agency action involved factual determinations. In Aponte v. Washington
State Department of Social and Health Services," the court ruled that an
agency's action cannot be substantially justified if the agency removes an
issue from consideration of the reviewing court.8 ' As such, Aponte is
only helpful to a practitioner facing an agency that capitulates. Mr.
Aponte's foster care license was revoked by the Department of Social
and Health Services (DSHS) because he refused to undergo a sexual
deviancy evaluation." DSHS also disqualified Mr. Aponte from
employment at a licensed daycare facility. 3 After judicial review had
commenced, and after Mr. Aponte's counsel had fully briefed his client's
position in both the license and the employment disqualification issues,
the Department withdrew the employment disqualification from
consideration.84 The court held that, "[g]iven DSHS's capitulation on the
issue, we are hard pressed to see how DSHS has met its burden of
demonstrating the decision to disqualify Mr. Aponte

.

.

.

was

substantially justified."85 The court was silent as to whether the
underlying agency action on the employment disqualification issue was
in fact substantially justified.

79. McFreeze Corp. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 102 Wash. App. 196, 6 P.3d 1187 (2000); Stuewe
v. State Dep't of Revenue, 98 Wash. App. 947, 991 P.2d 634 (2000); State Dep't of Revenue v.
Jenson, No. 22446-1-I, 1998 WL 79186 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1998).
80. 92 Wash. App. 604,965 P.2d 626 (1998).
81. Id. at 623, 965 P.2d at 635.
82. Id. at 611,965 P.2d at 629.
83. Id. at 608, 965 P.2d at 627.
84. Id. at 623, P.2d at 635.
85. Id.
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While the Aponte court was willing to separate distinct issues for
purposes of determining whether an agency action was substantially
justified, the court in del Rosario v. Washington State Department of
Labor and Industries6 reasoned that it was enough that the agency's
actions in their entirety were "essentially" justified. 7 In doing so, the del
Rosario court declined to separate distinct charges for purposes of the
WEAJA. 88 In del Rosario, the court affirmed the Department of Labor
and Industries (the Department) decision to cite Ernest del Rosario's
West & Loomis Ranches (Rosario) for failure to implement an accident
prevention program and for failure to provide effective information and
training on hazardous chemicals in the work area. 9 The Department also
cited Rosario for not providing protective gear.9" While the Department
prevailed on the first two citations, it did not prevail on the protective
gear citation.9 However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior
court's ruling that the board's position was substantially justified, stating
that it was "essentially" justified.92 The Court of Appeals did not
elaborate further on what "essentially" justified meant in relation to
substantially justified or why the agency was in fact substantially
justified. Nor did it elaborate on how many of the total number of
citations issued must fail the substantially justified test before a party that
prevails on at least one substantive and discrete citation can recover fees.
Thus, the two cases that address the substantial justification of an
agency's factual determinations are inconsistent. On the one hand, the
Aponte court held that an agency that withdraws an issue from
consideration cannot be substantially justified, even if it was justified
with regard to other issues involved in the same litigation.93 On the other
hand, the rule established by the del Rosario court implies that an
agency's action, viewed in its entirety, need only be essentially
justified.94

86. No. 17447-6-Il, 1999 WL495138 (Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 1999).
87. Id. at "5.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *5.
92. Id.
93. Aponte v. Wash. State Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 92 Wash. App. 604, 623, 965 P.2d
626,635 (1998).
94. Del Rosario, 1999 WL 495138 at *5.
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Interpretationof Statutes or Regulations Within the Expertise of the
AdministrativeAgency

In three WEAJA cases before the Washington Court of Appeals, the
underlying agency action involved the interpretation of statutes or
regulations within the expertise of the challenged agency. Here, too, the
practitioner is faced with conflicting decisions. In ALPS, the Court of
Appeals held that there was no substantial justification where an agency
action conflicted with the clear structure and intent of the relevant
statute.95 However, in Honesty in Environmental Analysis and
Legislation v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Boardp6 (HEAL), the court looked to factors extraneous to the
interpretation of the statute in question in order to excuse an agency
action that was clearly contrary to legislative intent.97 Finally, in Plum
Creek Timber Co. v. Washington State ForestPracticesAppeals Board,"
although the agency prevailed, the Court of Appeals explained in dicta
that the agency was substantially justified.9 9 In doing so, it reasoned that
where the issues are difficult, an agency is substantially justified.' The
result is that a practitioner cannot be certain that fees may be awarded
even where an agency has acted in a manner that is clearly contrary to
the structure and purpose of a statute.
In ALPS, the court held that an agency's interpretation of a statute is
not substantially justified when it is so clearly contrary to the intent of
the Legislature that it "begs reason."' ' The Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) chose to base its decision to allow logging in the Alps
Watershed based on a watershed analysis that ignored future forestry
practices. 2 The court ruled that the DNR's construction of the statute
and regulations was not plausible. In essence, the court reasoned that the
DNR could not allow a watershed analysis that ignores the effect of
future forestry practices to serve as an alternate regulatory scheme that
avoids review of forestry practices in environmentally sensitive areas:

95. ALPS, 102 Wash. App. 2, 16,979 P.2d 929, 936 (1999).
96. 96 Wash. App. 522,979 P.2d 864 (1999) [hereinafter HEAL].
97. Id. at 536, 979 P.2d at 872.
98. 99 Wash. App. 579,993 P.2d 287 (2000).
99. Id. at 595-96, 993 P.2d at 295-96.
100. Id.
101. ALPS, 102 Wash. App. at 19, 979 P.2d at 938.
102. Id. at 8, 979 P.2d at 933.
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[I]t begs reason to conclude that.., forest practices that would
otherwise require threshold [state EPA review] ...can be ignored
in the process of threshold ...analysis ....This is not a plausible
construction of the statutes and regulations here at issue. 3
The court addressed the question of whether the DNkR's action was
substantially justified. Noting that the WEAJA was patterned after the
Federal Act, the court, with no justification other than the statement that
"[w]e find this definition persuasive and adopt it"'0 4 adopted the
definition announced in Pierce v. Underwood. °5 Under Pierce,
"substantially justified" means "justified in substance or in the main-in
other words, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable
person."'0 6 The court also adopted the "abuse of discretion" standard of
review announced in Pierce. 7 The ALPS court awarded fees because
"DNR's position that future forest practices need not be considered
during threshold review begs reason."' ' The court gave little or no
deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute and regulations in
question despite the fact that this was a matter of first impression. In
ruling that the DNR was not substantially justified, the court did not
consider any factors beyond the strictures of statutory interpretation,
despite the fact that this was a matter of first impression, that it involved
a complicated issue, and that there were competing interests involved. 9
In contrast, the Court of Appeals in HEAL looked to the circumstances
surrounding the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Board's (Board) interpretation of the Growth Management Act (GMA)
to determine whether its action was substantially justified.Y' In 1995, the
City of Seattle amended both its critical areas regulations and the policies
upon which those regulations are based."' Honesty in Environmental
Analysis and Legislation and other landowners challenged the city's new
regulations and policies on the basis that they were not formulated using

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 16, 979 P.2d at 937.
Id. at 19, 979 P.2d at 938.
487 U.S. 552,565 (1988).
Id.
ALPS, 102 Wash. App. at 19, 979 P.2d at 938. (citing Pierce v. Undenvood, 487 U.S. 552,

565 (1988)).
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
HEAL 96 Wash. App. 522,536,979 P.2d 864, 872 (1999).
Id. at 523, 979 P.2d at 867.
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the best available science.' 12 The Board determined that, while it had
jurisdiction to review the city's new regulations-becausethe GMA
only requires the city to adopt critical areas regulations-it did not have
jurisdiction to review the policies of the city regarding critical areas
because the GMA does not require cities to adopt critical areas
policies." 3
The HEAL court examined the question of whether use of the best
available science is required in the formulation of critical areas policies
via standard and straightforward principles of statutory interpretation.
The GMA states that "[i]n designating and protecting critical areas under
this chapter, counties and cities shall include the best available science in
developing policies and development regulations to protect the functions
and values of critical areas."' 14 In rejecting the Board's decision that it
did not have jurisdiction to review critical areas policies, the court
concluded that:
[s]uch a holding would render a portion of [the statute] a
nullity .... RCW 36.70A.172(l) provides that counties and cities
"shall include" the best available science in developing both
policies and regulations regarding critical areas. Inclusion of best
available science in the development of critical areas policies and
regulations is therefore a mandate of the GMA."'
Despite the fact that the Board failed in a basic task of statutory
interpretation, the court decided that its position was substantially
justified.' The court reasoned that, because the Board's jurisdiction to
review a city's critical areas policies are implicit, rather than explicit, and
because an agency should be reluctant to assume jurisdiction beyond that
which is expressly granted, its action was substantially justified." 7 To
support this claim, the court stated that "the Legislature ... takes a dim
view of agencies granting themselves additional authority .... The
Board's reluctance to assert jurisdiction beyond that expressly granted, is
substantially justified ....

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 524, 979 P.2d at 867.
WAsH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.172.(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
HEAL, 96 Wash. App. at 528, 979 P.2d at 868.
Id. at 536, 979 P.2d at 872.
Id.
Id.
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In Plum Creek, the court provided dicta regarding "substantial
justification" to the effect that, where the decision is a difficult one, an
agency is presumed to be substantially justified." 9 The court's statements
regarding the WEAJA are dicta because the court ruled that the Forest
Practices Appeals Board (FPAB) was the prevailing party in all
respects.' Nevertheless, the court argued that FPAB's actions were
substantially justified, largely based on four extraneous factors. First,
"the case involves the balancing of sensitive, sometimes competing or
conflicting interests in a controversial area"; second, it "requires analysis
of close questions"; third, it is a case "on which there is no clear
precedent on point"'; and fourth, "[t]he FPAB's decision required
consideration of a complicated regulatory scheme as well as the
subjective issue of aesthetics.'' All of these reasons are extrinsic to the
quality of the justification itself. Rather, these are conditions which,
when present, seem to give a presumption of reasonableness to the
FPAB's position.
While the ALPS court ignored extraneous factors, the HEAL and Plum
Creek courts embraced them. Consequently, where the agency's action
involves a question of statutory or regulatory interpretation within the
expertise of the agency, Washington Court of Appeals decisions are
inconsistent.
C.

Questions ofPureLaw

The case law regarding the substantial justification of an agency's
action where the issue is one of pure law is likewise inconsistent. Of the
three cases, one, Hunter v. University of Washington,"2 ' merely
concludes that where the administrative agency keeps no record of its
decision, there can be no substantial justification." While this may be a
straightforward rule, the fact that the court applied the substantial
justification test to the wrong action by the agency puts that rule in
doubt. The other two cases inconsistently resolve the question of whether
an agency can be substantially justified when it violates agreed-to
procedures. In Construction Industry Training Council v. Washington
119. Plum Creek Timber Co. v. Wash. State Forest Practices Appeals Bd., 99 Wash. App. 579,
595-96, 993 P.2d 287, 295-96 (2000).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 101 Wash. App. 283,2 P.3d 1022 (2000).
123. Id. at 294, 2 P.3d at 1029.
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State Apprenticeship and Training Council (CITC),2 4 the court ruled
that, where circumstances justify, an agency may disregard its own
stipulations regarding settled matters. 25 However, the court in Sugano v.
was not substantially
University of Washington held that an agency
26
1
procedures.
agreed-to
violated
it
when
justified
In Hunter,the court held that the University of Washington's decision
to exclude law students from a tuition reduction program that targeted
veterans was not substantially justified because the University's
administrative record did not justify the regulations. 27 However, the
court ruled that the University's regulation regarding veteran tuition
reductions (the underlying agency action) was invalid because it did not
comply with the requirements of the Washington APA. 128 The reason the
University did not develop a record was that it maintained the position
that the tuition regulations did not fall within the Washington APA;
therefore, no record was necessary.2 9 Even though this procedural
decision was the agency action that underlay the cause of action, the
court looked to the justification of the substantive regulations to
determine whether the overall action was substantially justified. 30
The Washington statute at issue in Hunter provides that
"universities... may exempt veterans of the Vietnam conflict... from
the payment of all or a portion of any increase in tuition and fees.''. The
University imposed regulations on the tuition reduction program that,
among other things, excluded law students.' 32 The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's determination that the regulations did not fall
within the APA.'33
Because the University maintained that the regulations were not
subject to the Washington APA, it failed to keep an adequate record
justifying its position in compliance with WASH. REV. CODE §
34.05.320. 34 There was also no public comment period, as required by

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

96 Wash. App. 59,977 P.2d 655 (1999).
See infra text accompanying notes 137-140.
2000 WL 339895 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2000).
Hunter, 101 Wash. App. at 294,2 P.3d at 1029.
Id. at 291, 2 P.3d 1028.
Id. at 292-93, 2 P.3d at 1027-28.
Id. at 294, 2 P.3d at 1029.
Id. at 288,2 P.3d at 1026.
Id. at 286, 2 P.3d at 1025.
Id. at 291, 2 P.3d at 1028.
Id.
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the Washington APA.' 5 Because the regulations were not properly
adopted, and because of the paucity of the record, the court declined to
address the merit of the regulations, instead ruling that they were
invalid. 136
In CITC, the court looked to extraneous factors to determine that the
agency action was substantially justified, despite the fact that the agency
violated its own stipulations and a court order.'3 7 The Court of Appeals
ruled that the Council's position was substantially justified. 38 The court
listed three reasons for its decision: the agency's referral of the program
to adjudication was taken on advice of counsel, it was made in direct
response to a Supreme Court decision on similar facts, and the action
was taken in good faith as part of an effort to avoid unnecessary delay in
the final outcome of the instant case. 139 The court did not address the
reasonableness of the Council's decision to ignore its stipulation that it
would not refer the program to adjudication and the trial court's order to
the same effect. 4 °
In contrast, the Sugano court ruled that the agency was not
substantially justified in violating procedures agreed to in arbitration. 4 '
In 1993, Sugano was denied tenure. Sugano petitioned the University for
an adjudication of the tenure decision.'
The panel recommended
reinstatement pending a second review by a mentoring committee that
was not to include the faculty members who were on Sugano's tenure
review committee." The University President Gerberding accepted this
remedy.'"
Sugano was not granted tenure in the second review. 4 She petitioned
for a second adjudication, and the second adjudication panel found that
46
the vote "did not comply with the first panel's prescribed remedy."
135. Id. at 292-93,2 P.3d at 1028.
136. Id.
137. Constr. Indus. Training Council v. Wash. State Apprenticeship & Training Council, 96
Wash. App. 59,63,977 P.2d 655,657 (1999).
138. Id. at 69, 977 P.2d at 660.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Sugano v. Univ. of Wash., No. 98-2-00128-3, 2000 WL 339895, *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar.
27,2000).
142. Id. at *1-2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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President McCormick, recently appointed, reversed the findings of the
second adjudication panel and upheld the denial of tenure.' 47 Sugano
petitioned for judicial review of this action, and the Superior Court found
that the University did not follow the appropriate procedures in the
second tenure review. 148 The Superior Court also awarded fees pursuant
to the WEAJA. 149 The Court of Appeals upheld the award of fees
because the University's decision constituted an "erroneous
interpretation or application of the law and [was] based on a decisionmaking process that was inconsistent with the agreed-to procedure, in the
first adjudication. Given this finding, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in also finding that the University's decision was not
substantially justified."' 5 °
Thus, Washington Court of Appeals decisions regarding questions of
pure law are inconsistent. First, the Sugano court held that an agency
action could not be substantially justified when it failed to follow agreedto procedures. 5' Conversely, the CITC court looked to extraneous factors
to determine that the agency was substantially justified, despite the
agency's decision to ignore a court order and its own stipulations
Moreover, the Hunter court's decision is
regarding its conduct.'
unreliable due to its erroneous focus on the improper agency action.'53
V.

WHERE THE AGENCY ACTION IS A FACTUAL
DETERMINATION OR A STATUTORY OR REGULATORY
INTERPRETATION WITHIN ITS AREA OF EXPERTISE, THE
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION LIMIT IS REDUNDANT

The purpose of the substantial justification limit is to prevent
administrative agencies from having to pay every time a court overturns
their actions.'5 4 That function is more than adequately served by the
deferential standard of review courts use when reviewing agency
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.at *7.
152. Constr. Indus. Training Council v. Wash. State Apprenticeship & Training Council, 96
Wash. App. 59, 63, 977 P.2d 655, 657 (1999).
153. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Part I.B. Washington Legislative history is silent on the purpose of the substantial
justification limit. But see infra Part V.B for a discussion of the persuasiveness of federal judicial
interpretations on state statutes that parallel a like federal statute.
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decisions involving factual determinations or the interpretation of
statutes and regulations that are within the expertise of the challenged
agency. Because the determination on judicial review of whether an
agency action in these cases should be overturned and the substantial
justification question are functionally the same, the latter is redundant. At
best, the dual inquiries are a waste of judicial resources. At worst, the
redundancy provides an opportunity for overworked appellate courts to
make erroneous decisions by improperly applying the substantial
justification limit.
A.

The DeferentialStandardof Review Afforded Agencies 'Factual
DeterminationsRenders the SubstantialJustificationLimit
Redundant

Because a court can overturn an agency's factual determination only if
it is not based on substantial evidence,' 55 the substantial justification limit
is redundant. Both questions turn on the same determination of
reasonableness: an action cannot be substantially justified unless it has a
reasonable basis, and the determination that an agency action was
without substantial evidence turns on whether the evidence is sufficient
to convince a reasonable person.'5 6 Because the legislature stated that the
WEAJA was adopted to encourage citizens to defend themselves against
"inappropriate state agency actions" and against "unreasonable agency
action,"' 57 it is illogical to conclude that they intended to exempt state
agency actions that are not based on evidence sufficient to convince a
reasonable person.
Unfortunately, the two Court of Appeals cases that address questions
of fact do not properly reach the question of substantial justification.
Because the cases do not include the information necessary to determine
whether the substantial justification limitation (as opposed to the limits
on judicial review embodied in the APA) would have made a difference
in the outcome of the case, conclusive observations regarding the
limitation cannot be made. However, these cases do provide an
illustration of what might have happened had the courts properly reached
the substantial justification question.

155. Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wash. 2d 169, 176, 4 P.3d 123, 126
(2000).
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 403, § 901 (West).
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In Aponte, the court did not properly reach the substantial justification
issue because it ruled that an agency's action cannot be substantially
justified if the agency withdraws the issue from consideration of the
reviewing court." 8 This holding confuses litigation position and agency
action by equating a decision made in litigation with the merits of the
underlying action. 5 9 As the Supreme Court noted in Pierce, a decision
made after litigation begins does not necessarily reflect on the merits of
the underlying action, as when an agency settles a matter prior to the
completion of the litigation.6 0 Thus, the Aponte court did not properly
reach the substantial justification question.
Because the Aponte court did not include a description of what the
agency's justification was, it is difficult to say what the effect of the
substantial justification limit (as opposed to the standard of review
required by the APA) would have had on that case. 6 ' However, given
that the agency did not feel strongly enough about its decision to prevent
Mr. Aponte from working in a daycare facility as an employee (despite
the fact that DSHS believed that he might be a child molester),' 62 it
seems unlikely that it would have survived judicial review. Therefore,
the outcome regarding fees would likely have been the same regardless
of whether the substantial justification limit was in the statute.
The del Rosario court affirmed the Department's decision to cite
Rosario for failure to implement an accident prevention program and for
failure to provide effective information and training on hazardous
chemicals in the work area. 63 The Department also cited Rosario for not

158. Aponte v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 92 Wash. App. 604, 623, 965 P.2d
626, 635 (1998)
159. See supranotes 38-43 and accompanying text.
160. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568 (1988).
161. Furthermore, a rule that precludes the substantial justification of an agency action where the
agency withdraws the issue from consideration is contrary to the legislature's intent in enacting the
WEAJA and wastes judicial resources. An agency may well continue to pursue a case that it strongly
suspects it will not win if it will otherwise automatically pay fees. Thus the Pierce court rejected a
rule that settlements unfavorable to an agency precluded a finding of substantial justification: "[t]o
hold otherwise would not only distort the truth but penalize and thereby discourage useful
settlements." Id. Qualified individuals might likewise be discouraged as their legal bills mounted in
the face of an intransigent agency. See Estate of Merchant v. Comm'r IRS, 947 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("The government's decision to concede, rather than to litigate an arguable legal issue,
does not in itself indicate that the government's pre-settlement position was unreasonable.").
162. Aponte, 92 Wash. App. at 609-10, 965 P.2d at 628-29.
163. Del Rosario v. Wash. State Dep't of Labor & Indus., 1999 WL 495138, *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 13, 1999).
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providing protective gear.'" As the court noted, "the primary question
here is simply whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial
16 While the Department prevailed on the first two citations, it
evidence.""
did not prevail on the protective gear citation.'66 However, the court
affirmed the superior court's ruling that the board's entire action was
substantially justified.'67
The del Rosario court did not properly apply the WEAJA. It is true
that, in the federal scheme, a court must look at the entirety of the
government's position to determine the substantial justification issue. 63
However, where only the underlying agency action must be substantially
justified, and where a party prevails on an issue that could have been a
cause of action in its own right (as when a business is issued multiple
citations), then a party should only need to prove that the government's
action in regard to that one issue was not substantially justified. Of
course, only fees and costs incurred as a result of litigating the issue upon
which the party prevailed ought to be awarded. This was the reasoning of
the Aponte court, which awarded fees to Mr. Aponte that he incurred in
issue only, even though he failed to
connection with the employment
1 69
issue.
licensing
the
on
prevail
The del Rosario court did not discuss why the trial court ruled in favor
of Rosario, and so it is not possible to say whether the application of the
substantial evidence standard here would have yielded a different result
than the substantial justification limit. As noted above, the result should
have been the same. However, because the Court of Appeals was forced
to engage in the additional substantial justification inquiry, its resources
were unnecessarily expended. Furthermore, the appeals court was
afforded an opportunity to make an erroneous decision with the
unfortunate result of encouraging administrative agencies to litigate
beyond the point at which they might othervise settle a matter. 7

164. Id. at "1.
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id. at *1-2.
167. Id. at *5.
168. See Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the EAJA inquiry does not focus only upon the narrow issue on which a party prevailed but upon the
entire litigation of which that issue may have been only a small part).
169. Aponte v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 92 Wash. App. 604, 624, 965 P.2d

626,635 (1998).
170. See supra note 161.
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The DeferentialStandard ofReview Afforded Interpretationsof
Statutes or Regulations Within the Expertise of the Challenged
Agency Renders the SubstantialJustificationLimit Redundant

A court will only overturn an agency's interpretation of a statute or
regulation within its expertise if the agency has acted in an unreasonable
fashion, either because its interpretation was implausible or because it
was clearly contrary to legislative intent. 171 Similarly, the substantial
justification limit turns on reasonableness. 7 2 Both questions require the
same determination: an action cannot be substantially justified unless it
has a reasonable basis, and a determination that an agency's
interpretation was implausible or clearly contrary to legislative intent
precludes a finding of reasonableness. When the legislature stated that
the WEAJA was adopted to allow citizens to defend themselves against
"inappropriate state agency actions" and against "unreasonable agency
action,"' 173 it seems unlikely that it intended for state agency actions that
were implausible or clearly contrary to legislative intent to be exempt
from the statute's coverage.
The Washington Court of Appeals cases that have addressed the
"substantial justification" of an agency's interpretation of a statute or
regulation within its expertise either would have been resolved in the
same way had the substantial justification limit not been part of the
statute or they were erroneously decided. The erroneous decisions
occurred either because the court improperly applied extraneous factors
in deciding whether an agency action was substantially justified or
because the court did not properly reach the substantial justification
issue. The legislature's goals would have been more properly served had
the "substantial justification" limit not been required and judicial
resources could have been put to more productive use.
There are two cases from the Washington Court of Appeals that
properly reach the question of whether an agency's statutory or
regulatory interpretation was substantially justified.174 In ALPS, the
outcome would have been the same had the "substantially justified"
171. See supra Part II.
172. Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y v. Wash. State Dep't of Natural Res., 102 Wash. App. 1, 19, 979
P.2d 929, 938 (1999).
173. 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 403, § 901 (West).
174. In Plum Creek, the court addressed a question of statutory and regulatory interpretation as
well. Plum Creek Timber Co. v. Wash. State Forest Practices Appeals Bd., 99 Wash. App. 579, 59596, 993 P.2d 287, 295-96 (2000). However, because the agency prevailed, that discussion is dicta.
See infra Part IV.B.
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limitation not been in play. However, in HEAL, relying on the APA
limits to judicial review would have pre-empted an erroneous application
of the law of "substantial justification."
The ALPS court awarded fees to the plaintiffs after determining that
the DNR was not substantially justified in adopting and implementing its
watershed analysis regulations.' The court began its discussion by
noting that, in drafting a regulation pursuant to a statute, all the agency
need do to prevail in a judicial review is to come forward with a
plausible statutory or regulatory construction that is not contrary to
legislative intent.'76 In approving the superior court's award of fees, the
ALPS court stated that "DNR's position that future forest practices need
not be considered during threshold review begs reason."' 77 Thus, the
court used the same reasoning to determine both whether the agency
action was substantially justified and if the action was plausible and not
contrary to legislative intent.
The HEAL court examined the Board's interpretation of the GMA de
novo.' 78 Nevertheless, it noted that "[w]e accord deference to an agency
interpretation of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in
dealing with such issues. . . .,,179 Even given that deference, the court
ruled that the Board failed in an everyday matter of statutory
interpretation. Because the Board was the only body authorized to hear
complaints that a governmental agency is not in compliance with the
GMA, "the Board's decision that it... has no jurisdiction... would
render a portion of [the statute] a nullity."' 80
An interpretation that renders a portion of a statute null is not
plausible. The HEAL court implied that the proper statutory language
was clear: "[t]he legislature must have intended an enforcement
mechanism for RCW 36.70.172. Because the Board's review is that
mechanism, implicitly the legislature must have intended the Board have
jurisdiction." ''
Nevertheless, the HEAL court held that the Board's action was
substantially justified. The court reasoned that "the Board's reluctance to
175. ALPS, 102 Wash. App. at 19, 979 P.2d at 938.
176. Id. at 14, 979 P.2d at 936.
177. Id. at 19, 979 P.2d at 938.
178. Id. at 14, 979 P.2d at 935.
179. Honesty in Envtl. Analysis and Legislation v. Cent. Puget Sound Grovth Mgmt. Hearings
Bd., 96 Wash. App. 522,526,979 P.2d 864,867 (1999).
180. Id. at 528, 979 P.2d at 868.
181. Id. at 536, P.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
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assert jurisdiction beyond that expressly granted, is substantially
justified."' 8' Here, the court looked beyond the strictures of proper
statutory interpretation by explaining the context in which the
interpretation was made; agencies are reluctant to assume jurisdiction.' 83
These considerations are properly applied to the justification of a
litigation position, not an agency action.
Washington courts, like the one in HEAL, that use factors external to
the justification of the underlying agency action have not taken sufficient
account of the differences between the federal and state Acts. While the
former requires that the position of the agency must be substantially
justified in order to avoid an award of fees,' 84 the latter requires only
"that the agency action [be] substantially justified."' 85 Thus, the federal
EAJA calls for an evaluation of the agency's conduct both at the time of
the underlying action as well as during the ensuing litigation over the
propriety of that initial action. In contrast, the WEAJA only requires that
the agency action be substantially justified. Because external factors are
only relevant where the litigation position of the agency must be
substantially justified,'86 reliance on external factors where only the
justification of the agency action is in question is not in accord with the
Legislature's intent.
Washington courts will assume that the Legislature was aware of the
distinction between agency action and an agency's position in litigation
when it adopted the WEAJA. The WEAJA was adopted in 1995; by then,
the 1985 amendments to the Federal Act were ten years old, and
numerous federal cases made clear the effect of the action/position
distinction." 7 In Woodson v. State, the Washington Supreme Court noted
that the Legislature "is presumed to know the existing state of the case
law in those areas in which it is legislating."' 88 Furthermore, where
different words are used in a state statute that is modeled after a federal

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.350(1) (2001); 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 403,
(emphasis added).
186. See supra PartI.
187. See, e.g., Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329,332 (9th Cir. 1988).

188. 95 Wash. 2d 257,262,623 P.2d 683, 685 (1980).

§ 903

(West)
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statute, it is reasonable to infer that the state legislature intended a
different meaning. 89
Rules of statutory interpretation in Washington compel the conclusion
that extraneous factors ought not be considered when determining
whether an agency action is substantially justified. Washington courts
have adopted the rule that judicial interpretations of similar statutes of
other jurisdictions are persuasive authority. 9 ' When construing a state
statute that substantially parallels a federal statute, courts may consider
federal interpretations of the parallel statute.19' Similarly, when there are
differences between otherwise similar laws, courts assume that
legislatures intended for there to be a difference in the interpretation of
those statutes.'92 Therefore, the application of the substantial justification
standard that best represents the intent of the legislature is one that only
considers the merits of the underlying agency action. That is, discussions
of extraneous factors such as other authority, whether the matter is one of
first impression, and so on, are not proper.
Using extraneous factors to determine whether the underlying agency
action is substantially justified also serves as a deterrent to any would-be
party who wishes to challenge an agency's reluctance to assume
jurisdiction. Regardless of the (un)reasonableness of an agency's
decision, as long as its jurisdiction is only implicit, a party must accept
that it will pay all of its own litigation costs. This result is contrary to the
legislature's intent to prevent "certain individuals.., and other
organizations [from being] deterred from seeking review... against an
unreasonable agency action because of the expense involved in securing
the vindication of their rights in administrative proceedings."' 93 Neither
is the public interest served by discouraging aggrieved parties from
litigating against administrative agencies that fail to enforce the
mandates of the legislature, especially in regards to the GMA and similar
environmental statutes that depend on agency enforcement for
effectiveness. It is unlikely that any single individual will have a

189. See Constr. Indus. Training Council v. Wash. State Apprenticeship & Training Council, 96
Wash. App. 59, 66, 977 P.2d 655, 660 (1999) ("If the Legislature had intended to adopt the federal
scheme, it would have done so explicitly, not by omission."); see also Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St.

387,403, (1853).
190. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 128, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978) (holding that
'Judicial interpretations of [similar acts] are particularly helpful in construing our own").
191. Hollingsworth v. Wash. Mut. Say. Bank, 37 Wash. App. 386,390,681 P.2d 845,848 (1984).
192. See supranote 189.
193. 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 403, § 901 (West).
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sufficient economic stake in a particular case or decision to justify
paying costly attorney's fees. Consequently, only a fee-shifting provision
like the WEAJA can ensure vigorous opposition to agency's who fail to
perform their statutorily imposed duties.
The HEAL decision demonstrates that the only way a court can find
that an agency interpretation of a statute or regulation within its expertise
should be overturned, yet not award costs, is to misapply the substantial
justification limit. Rather than invite such erroneous decisions, the limit
itself should be removed.
VI. WHERE THE AGENCY ACTION IS A QUESTION OF PURE
LAW, THE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION LIMIT
PREVENTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Where the agency action involves either the interpretation of statutes
that are outside the scope of its expertise, or where the issue is one of
pure law, then the substantial justification inquiry is not redundant
because the standard of review is error of law, and courts do not defer to
the agency.' 94 However, the application of the substantially justified
limitation in these circumstances results in consequences contrary to the
goals that the Legislature intended to achieve when it enacted the
WEAJA. It has also created an unpredictable body of law. This exception
is also an unwarranted drain onjudicial resources. In other words, where
it matters, the limit can eclipse the statute.
A.

Applying the SubstantialJustificationLimit Is Contraryto the
LegislativeIntent Underlying the WEAJA

Where courts overturn an agency action yet find that the underlying
action is substantially justified, they act contrary to the goals the
legislature intended to meet when it enacted the WEAJA. First, where
the Washington Court of Appeals applies factors extraneous to the merits
of the underlying action to determine whether it was substantially
justified, it places a stumbling block before the prevailing party that is
not contemplated by the statute. 95 Thus, in CITC, the court denied fees

despite the fact that there was no substantial justification for the
194. See supraPart III.
195. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of extraneous
factors to the substantial justification of agency actions).
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' By ignoring its own stipulations and the resulting
underlying action. 96
97
the agency violated Washington court rules.19
pre-trial order,'
Nevertheless, the CITC court found that the agency's action was
substantially justified. 9
Aside from the obvious problem with tacit approval of agencies'
decisions to ignore court orders, the CITC court looked only to
extraneous factors to decide whether the agency action was substantially
justified.2" 0 Absent those factors, the court would have been compelled to
conclude that ignoring stipulations and court orders was not a
substantially justified action: no court should find that a party that
ignores a court order acted reasonably. To do so would be to question the
orderly administration of justice wherein parties appeal court orders that
they disagree with rather than taking matters into their own hands.
Furthermore, where the agency has not prevailed on a question of pure
law, a failure to award fees is contrary to the purposes of the WEAJA.01
For instance, had the Hunter court properly applied the substantial
justification limit to the appropriate agency action, it is entirely possible
that the court would have found that action substantially justified. There,
the dispositive issue turned out to be the University's erroneous
conclusion that regulations that restrict a tuition reduction benefit do not
fall within the APA." 2 Nevertheless, the court looked to the University's
adoption of the regulation itself (rather than the validity of the
procedures by which it was adopted) to determine whether the action was
substantially justified.0 3 The court held that the University was not
substantially justified as "the paucity of the University's record prevents
it from substantially justifying its actions."2 "4 However, the position of
the University was not that the regulations themselves were substantially
justified; rather, the University's contention was that the regulations were
not subject to the APA; therefore, the University is not required to justify
196. See supranotes 137-140 and accompanying text.
197. Constr. Indus. Training Council v. Wash. State Apprenticeship & Training Council, 96
Wash. App. 59, 63, 977 P.2d 655, 657 (1999).
198. See Wash. Superior Ct. R. 16.
199. CITC,96 Wash. App. at 69,977 P.2d at 660 (1999).
200. Id.
201. While the meager legislative history of the WEAJA is silent on the need to protect the public
interest, the federal law upon which it is modeled was enacted for that purpose. See supra note 33
and accompanying text.
202. Hunter v. Univ. of Wash., 101 Wash. App. 283,293,2 P.3d 1022, 1025 (2000).
203. Id. at 294, 2 P.3d at 1029.
204. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:169, 2002

them. 2 5 Their claim was either that the regulations were fiscal processes,
or that the benefit was conferred by the University: in either case, the
issue was one of pure law, and the record that the University made
regarding the justification of the regulations was immaterial.206 Instead,
the underlying action was the decision not to apply WAPA procedures.
Because a person can challenge an agency action based on procedure, 0 7
the choice of procedure is also an underlying agency action. If the
University itself had been correct in its interpretation of the requirements
of the APA, then its regulation would have been validly adopted.
Had the court looked to the proper action to determine whether the
agency was substantially justified, the outcome might well have been
different. Aside from the unpredictability inherent in deciding whether an
agency was reasonable in its actions, the court might have applied
extraneous factors to find in favor of the University. For instance, the
question of whether the University must follow APA procedures when
adopting regulations regarding statutorily authorized tuition reductions is
a matter of first impression.
If the court had found that the action was substantially justified, Mr.
Hunter would have won the right to a fair and just regulation regarding
tuition reduction for Vietnam veterans throughout the state, but entirely
at his own expense. While Mr. Hunter may have been willing to incur the
kinds of debt that litigation breeds (or he may have found an attorney to
take his case pro bono), a legislative scheme that aims to foster publicminded litigation like Mr. Hunter's cannot assume that such altruistic
behavior is the rule and not the exception. If it were, there would be no
need for the WEAJA in the first instance.
VII. WASHINGTON COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION LIMIT HAS RENDERED
THE APPLICATION OF THE WEAJA UNPREDICTABLE
A court's decision regarding the substantial justification limit is
unpredictable to a practitioner deciding whether to pursue judicial review
of an agency action on behalf of a qualified party. Predictability is a
central "rule of law" value, and the Washington Supreme Court has
directed courts to interpret statutes in a manner that is predictable.0 8
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 290,2 P.3d at 1027.
Id. at 290-91, 2 P.3d at 1027-28.
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(c) (2001).
See Salts v. Estes, 133 Wash. 2d 160, 170, 943 P.2d 275, 280 (1997).
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However, the ambiguous nature of what constitutes a substantial
justification is a roadblock to predictability. As the Pierce court noted,
the issue is "a multifarious and novel question, little susceptible... [to]
useful generalization.""2 9
For instance, the Sugano court could well have decided the issue of
substantial justification differently. The court reasoned that, because the
University had erroneously interpreted the law and violated agreed-upon
procedures that resulted from a previous adjudication, it was not
substantially justified.2 1 ° However, the court could have decided that,
because the issue was one of first impression, the University was
substantially justified. Furthermore, the Sugano court's implication that a
failure to follow agreed-upon procedures precludes a finding of
substantial justification is contradicted by the CTIC court, which found
that the agency's action was substantially justified, despite the fact that
the agency failed to follow agreed-to stipulations and a court order 1
The Washington Court of Appeals has also established contradictory,
and thus unpredictable, rules regarding substantial justification. For
instance, the court in Aponte held that each separate cause of action must
be independently and substantially justified. 1 In contrast, the del
Rosario court held that an agency was substantially justified, even
though it only reached that conclusion in two of three separate and
distinct citations issued by the Department. l ' Thus, a practitioner
defending multiple charges cannot predict whether a court will award
fees if one charge is unreasonable but others issued at the same time are
reasonable. And in ALPS, the court did not consider that the issue was
one of first impression, where the court in HEAL found that factor
(amongst others) persuasive. 1 ' These contradictory rules render the
WEAJA unpredictable.

209. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988).
210. Sugano v. Univ. of Wash., 2000 WL 339895, *7 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
211. Constr. Indus. Training Council v. Wash. State Apprenticeship & Training Council, 196
Wash. App. 59,62,977 P.2d 655, 657 (1999).
212. Aponte v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Senws., 92 Wash. App. 604, 624, 965 P.2d
626, 635 (1998)
213. Del Rosario v. Wash. State Dep't of Labor & Indus., 1999 WL 495138, *3-5 (Wash. CL
App. July 13,1999).
214. See supra Part IV.B.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Where the issue is one of fact or where it regards statutory or
regulatory interpretation within the purview of an administrative agency,
the substantially justified limit to awards under the WEAJA is
superfluous at best, and is thus a waste of judicial resources. At worst,
forcing courts and litigants to engage in another layer of justification
(separate from that engaged in when evaluating the underlying agency
action) creates opportunities for erroneous consideration of extraneous
factors.
Where questions of pure law are at issue, the application of the
substantial justification does not serve the legislature's intention to level
the playing field between agencies and private actors for the benefit of
both those individuals and for the wider society. By definition, qualified
parties are not in the position to squander their meager financial
resources in pursuit of justice. Where questions of law are at issue,
particularly matters of new impression that potentially affect large
numbers of people, society is not served if administrative agencies can
control the field by virtue of their size and resources, except when they
act the most unreasonably.
Furthermore, removing the substantial justification limit is not
antithetical to the goal of preventing an award of fees every time an
individual or business prevails in a judicial review of an agency action.
Aside from the fact that fees are awarded only when the agency has
failed to overcome the generous standards of review courts afford them,
there are still two other statutory prerequisites to recovery. The party
must be qualified,"' meaning that wealthy plaintiffs cannot recover, and
the award cannot be unjust.
The adversarial system serves a social function, in that it provides a
vigorous interrogation of legal and social issues that, by virtue of the
functioning of precedent, affects ever-larger numbers of people. In these
instances, it is not just that one individual or a small group of individuals
is forced to bear half the litigation costs of this social good, even when
they prevail. It is one thing to ask individuals (and often practitioners) to
risk losing a case. It is a different question to ask that they pay the costs
of their valuable social service in all cases except those in which the
administrative agency acts unreasonably. As Justice Brennan noted, "I
would hope that the Government rarely engages in litigation [where the
215. See supra note 52.

Washington Equal Access to Justice Act
Government's position was one having no substance]., 21 6 Yet it is to
those circumstances that the jurisprudence of substantial justification has
limited the WEAJA. At its earliest opportunity, the Washington
Legislature should remove it from the statute.

216. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 577 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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